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Politics, Economics, and the Regulation of Direct Interstate  














In 1986, the State of California passed legislation restricting the direct importation of 
wine from another state by California residents unless the originating state allowed the 
reciprocal privilege of direct shipment from California wineries to residents in that state.  
This proved to be the opening salvo in a series of legislative and judicial battles across 
the country.  State direct shipment regulations that were uniform across 47 of the 50 
states prior to 1986 now constitute a patchwork of regulations.  This raises unique 
interstate trade questions due to the special treatment of alcohol in the U.S. Constitution.  
While the Commerce Clause forbids states from discriminating against interstate 
commerce, the 21
st Amendment affords states the right to regulate alcohol within their 
borders.  Courts are divided in their opinions on direct shipment regulation; some find 
that prohibiting direct shipment unconstitutionally restricts interstate commerce while 
others find the regulations consistent with the public interest rationale of the 21
st 
Amendment.  This paper attempts to shed light on the motivations for the various forms 
of regulation adopted across states in response to California’s adoption of reciprocity.  
Using a competing risks hazard model, we examine how various economic and public 
interest factors affect the speed with which a state adopts a change in its direct shipment 
regulation and that nature of that change.  Our results suggest that economic 
considerations, not public interest factors, lie at the root of direct shipment regulations in 
the wine industry. 
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I. Introduction 
 
In 1986, the State of California passed legislation restricting the direct shipment of wine 
from other states to California citizens unless the originating state allowed California 
wineries to direct ship to that state’s citizens.  This “reciprocity” restriction on direct 
shipment marked a change from California’s previously unfettered direct shipment 
regime.  Although California made the direct shipment of wine to California residents 
more difficult, the legislation’s intent was to open up direct shipment to wine markets 
across the country.   
Prior to 1986, direct shipment of wine to consumers was a misdemeanor crime in 
47 states.  In addition to California, only Alaska and Rhode Island permitted direct 
shipment of wine.  California’s reciprocity legislation required that states prohibiting 
direct shipment of wine to their citizens open their markets to direct shipping in order for 
wineries in those states to be able to ship directly to California consumers.  In effect, 
California attempted to leverage its large wine consuming population to pry open access 
to the rest of the country for the state’s wine industry. 
The response has been mixed.  In the past 17 years, 43 states have considered a 
total of over 160 bills proposing changes to their direct shipment laws. Twenty-five states 
have adopted some form of direct shipment allowance, ranging from reciprocity 
regulations to permitting systems to special handling provisions.  Four states elected to 
retain their prohibition, but increased the severity of the penalty by making direct 
shipment a felony.     3
Because direct shipment laws specifically regulate interstate commerce, the courts 
have been drawn into the battle.  Proponents of direct shipping have filed suits arguing 
that state restrictions on direct shipment violate the Commerce Clause (Article I, Section 
8) of the U.S. Constitution, which grants the federal government the right to regulate 
trade “among the several states.”  However, states point to the Constitution’s 21
st 
Amendment, which gives states the sole authority to regulate the sale and distribution of 
alcoholic beverages within their borders.  As in the legislative arena, the court’s rulings 
are mixed.  Direct shipment cases have been heard in seven of the 12 federal circuits.  At 
the District Court level, five of seven courts have found direct shipment restrictions 
unconstitutional.  The two appellate court decisions in the 7
th and 4
th Circuit Courts of 
Appeal resulted in split decisions; the 7
th Circuit found direct shipment restrictions 
constitutional while the 4
th Circuit ruled them unconstitutional. 
At the heart of the debate in both the legislative and judicial arenas is a question 
of public interest.  In analyzing the enforceability of state laws under both the Commerce 
Clause and the 21
st Amendment, courts consider the public welfare concerns addressed 
by the state regulation.  In the case of the Commerce Clause, the regulation must be 
shown to advance state health, safety, and welfare.  In addition to this public interest 
requirement, the courts also require that the social gains exceed the burden on interstate 
commerce and that no less-restrictive alternative is available to achieve the social 
objective.  Courts’ analytical framework under the 21
st Amendment is less restrictive; the 
purpose of the regulation may be to 1) promote temperance, 2) raise revenue, or 3) 
“ensure orderly market conditions.”  There is no requirement for evaluation of the net 
benefit or the availability of less-restrictive alternatives.   4
Our purpose in this paper is to shed light on the motivating factors for regulations 
on the direct shipment of wine among states.  In particular, we use a competing risks 
hazard model to estimate how various measures of economic and public interests in each 
of the 47 prohibition states affect the likelihood of a state changing its laws to allow 
direct shipment of wine, the nature of the direct shipment allowance, and the speed with 
which the state adopts the new legislation.  We find that economic interests play a 
significant role in determining a state’s adoption of direct shipment, but no evidence 
supports general public interest motivation.   
The paper proceeds with a brief review of the literature in Section 2.  Section 3 
provides an overview of the wine industry, the economic forces at work in the industry 
over the last two decades, and the resulting push for direct shipment legislation.  Section 
4 contains a discussion of the data and methods used to examine the political economy of 
direct shipment legislation.  The empirical results are discussed in Section 5, followed by 
the conclusion and discussion of possible extensions. 
 
II. Previous  Research 
Little has been published in the economics literature on the domestic U.S. wine industry.  
Most research focuses on various dimensions of demand for wine products including 
price and quality (Krasker; Jaeger; Blaylock and Blisard; Buccola and VanderZanden; 
Landon and Smith) and liberalization of North American trade (Heien and Sims).  
Consequently, most published reports are found in trade journals such as Wines & Vines 
and Wine Spectator.   5
Similarly, economic research on interstate commerce is primarily focused on 
transportation industries and the role of the Interstate Commerce Act (ICA) of 1887.  
Childs documents the adversarial nature of federal versus state regulation of railroads 
post-ICA and the evolution of a “pragmatic federalism” that grew to characterize federal-
state relations in a variety of regulated industries.  Elmslie and Milberg hold up the 
Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution as model for regulation of international trade, 
likening international commerce to commerce between U.S. states.  O’Driscoll, on the 
other hand, provides a brief overview of how interstate restrictions on trade circumvent 
Commerce Clause issues for a variety of commodity and service industries.  Direct 
shipment of alcoholic beverages, however, is not mentioned.  Although economists have 
paid little attention the direct shipment of wine, the number and diversity of court cases 
and opinions described above as well as the plethora of legislation considered in the past 
15 years have spurred legal scholars to address the issue (see Martin (2000, 2001); Foust; 
Douglass; and Kozusko for examples).  
  A much larger literature exists concerning the political economy of regulation.  
This literature can be broadly broken down into two competing camps: the public interest 
and private interest theories of regulation.  The public interest theory purports that 
government intervention maximizes social welfare by correcting market failures (Joskow 
and Noll), particularly in the presence of positive transaction costs (Coase, 1960; Noll).  
The private interest or economic theory of regulation argues that regulations result from a 
political competition among private interests in attempt to gain or protect economic rents 
(Stigler; Posner; Peltzman; Becker).  In their analysis of bank branching deregulation, 
Kroszner and Strahan argue that private interest theory has been more successful in   6
explaining a wide variety of regulatory interventions, while public interest arguments 
better explain the removal of such regulations.  They go on to conclude that, in the case 
of bank branching restrictions, private interests appear to drive deregulation. 
  This paper is similar to Kroszner and Strahan’s in that we are examining the 
drivers of deregulation of interstate direct shipment of wine.  However, this paper has 
broader implications due to the nature of the regulations being considered and the unique 
constitutional question surrounding such restrictions.  Since public welfare interests are 
the sole redeeming feature of state restrictions on interstate commerce, determining 
whether public or private interests are the primary drivers of direct shipment laws is of 
immediate consequence beyond validation of regulatory theories.  This paper also 
provides a rare glimpse into the economic underpinnings of a rapidly growing, and highly 
regulated, sector of the agricultural economy.   
 
III.  Structural Change in the Wine Industry and the Direct Shipment Response 
3.1 Structural Change in Wine Production  
The past 25 years have witnessed tremendous growth in the wine industry.  In 1975, there 
were 800 wineries in 34 states.  By 2002, over 3,180 wineries were in operation across all 
50 states (Wines & Vines Annual Buyer’s Guide, 1974, 2002).  Most of this growth has 
come in the form of small wineries.  “Free the Grapes!,” a wine industry trade 
association, reports that the 50 largest wineries account for 95% of U.S. wine production. 
  One reason for the growth among small wineries is the capital required to open a 
winery.  Folwell, Ball and Bale estimate the capital cost of starting a small (2,000 annual 
cases) winery to be $700,000.  Increasing the scale to 10,000 annual cases requires a total   7
investment of $2.7 million.  These amounts do not include the cost of developing 
vineyards to supply grapes.  For several reasons, some of which will be addressed below, 
investors may wish to enter at a smaller scale and retain the option to expand as their 
product and consumer base becomes established.   
Some producers may not wish to be large at all.  In their study of wine producer 
motivation, Scott-Morton and Podolny find a large segment of small wine producers, 
which they refer to as “utility-maxizers” or hobbyists, that enjoy producing high-quality 
wines and charge higher quality-adjusted prices, even at the expense of increased 
revenues and profits.  They find that profit-oriented producers are less likely to produce 
high quality wines.   
  That is not to suggest that small wineries are necessarily less profitable.  Folwell, 
Bale and Ball conclude that small wineries (with output levels of between 2,000 and 
10,000 annual cases) can be more profitable than 50,000, 200,000 and 500,000 annual 
case production wineries.  This conclusion is based on the assumption that small wineries 
tend to produce super premium wines that are sufficiently differentiated to command a 
higher price and to sell most of their product either through tasting rooms or winery-
operated retail stores instead of through distributors.  The higher margins obtained by 
direct sales offset the higher per-case cost of production. 
  In summary, the past 25 years have seen an enormous growth in the number of 
U.S. wineries.  A relative few, very large wineries comprise 95% of U.S. production, 
operating primarily through traditional distribution channels, while a host of small 
wineries operate primarily through direct sales in their local markets.  For smaller 
wineries to access a larger geographic market, they must develop relations with   8
distributors to carry their products or find alternative means for directly accessing distant 
markets. 
3.2 Structural Change in Distribution and Retail  
  During this time, the number of licensed wine and spirits distributors in the U.S. 
decreased dramatically, from over 1600 in 1984 to less than 600 in 2002 (National 
Beverage Marketing Directory).  This consolidation trend resulted from a U.S. Supreme 
Court decision in California Retail Liquor Dealers Assoc. v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 
which struck down an alcoholic beverage price posting law in California.  The law had 
prohibited distributors from selling alcoholic beverages to retailers at prices below 
official posted prices, thereby forcing distributors to compete on service rather than price.  
Similar laws were in place in virtually every state.  Everett argues that when the Supreme 
Court found such laws in violation of the Sherman Act, distributors were freed to 
compete on price, thereby driving out less efficient distributors and spurring drastic 
consolidation. 
This consolidation is particularly significant given the traditional three-tier 
distribution system adopted by most states following the repeal of prohibition.  The three-
tier system requires alcoholic beverages to be sold to a state licensed distributor that in 
turn sells the product to a state licensed retailer before consumers purchase the product.  
In some instances, the state owns and even operates distribution activities in the state; 
occasionally, the state also owns or franchises the retail operations.  For most states, 
however, private firms are licensed to perform these activities within the state.  A 
reduction in the number of distributors means fewer distribution outlets for wineries to 
get their products into other markets.     9
Moreover, since few distributors have licensed operations in all 50 states, wine 
producers may have to develop relations with several different distributors to gain access 
to a broad geographic market.  Thus, there are potentially high transaction costs for 
wineries in identifying and negotiating marketing agreements with distributors across 
several states.  These costs are exacerbated by “franchise laws” in some states that make 
it difficult, if not impossible, for producers of alcoholic beverages to unilaterally 
terminate relations with a distributor (Everett). 
From the distributor’s perspective, carrying small volume wine products also 
creates transaction costs.  Unlike many wholesalers, alcohol distributors do not simply 
resell or direct product to established retail outlets.  Alcohol distributors are frequently 
responsible for developing and implementing promotional activities for the products that 
they carry.  Distributor-sponsored wine tastings, advertising, and physical displays are 
just some of the expenses typically incurred.  Small volume products may not justify 
marketing costs on the part of the distributor. 
While distribution became more concentrated, national retail systems also became 
more concentrated.  Although the number of retail outlets has grown, both in grocery and 
in hotel and restaurant service sectors, the number of companies controlling those outlets 
has decreased.  Centralized purchasing for these retail systems has created further 
pressure for higher volume wine products.  Moreover, competition for shelf space at the 
retail level places pressure on both the retailer and the distributor to offer recognized 
brands with established consumer bases.  Although space is typically allocated for 
smaller specialty runs, shelf space is not proportional to the number of small wine   10
producers, adding to the difficulty small wineries may have in acquiring a distributor 
relationship. 
Anecdotal evidence supports the assertion that distribution is difficult and costly 
to access, even for larger producers.  Ernst & Julio Gallo, by far the largest producer in 
the U.S., has developed its own national distribution company.  Fosters Brewing of 
Australia, primarily a beer producer, acquired Beringer, another large California winery, 
in 2001 to leverage Beringer’s established distribution system for Foster’s expansion in 
the U.S. market.  Canandagua, a large Canadian distributor with facilities in much of the 
U.S., has purchased a portfolio of medium-sized wineries to take advantage of its 
distribution capacity.  Such acquisitions and vertical integration suggests the costs of 
market transactions to achieve the same market access must be substantively high (Coase, 
1937). 
3.3  The Direct Shipment Response 
As seen in Figure 1, California has the most wineries of any state in the U.S.  Between 
1980 and 1986, the number of wineries in California grew by 60%.  Given the favorable 
economics of direct shipment for small wineries and continuing consolidation in the 
distribution and retail sectors, lobbying for direct shipment of wine to consumers is a 
logical response for small wineries seeking to increase their volume, consumer base, and 
geographic market.   
Prior to 1986, 47 states prohibited the direct shipment of wine to consumers.  
Other than California, only Alaska and Rhode Island—not very large wine-consuming 
markets—permitted direct shipment.  Unlike Alaska and Rhode Island, however, 
California also boasted the largest wine consuming market in the U.S., to which wineries   11
in other states had ready access given California’s liberal direct shipment allowance.  In 
what might be described as a “tit-for-tat” strategy, California passed legislation in 1986 
that effectively shut out direct shipments from wineries in other states unless those states 
would allow California wineries to direct ship into those states.  This reciprocity standard 
created incentives for other states to open their borders to California wines in order to 
gain access to the largest consuming market in the country for their own wine industries.   
As noted earlier, the response has been varied.  In the first seven years following 
California’s move, 11 states adopted reciprocity direct shipment legislation, thereby 
opening their borders to California wines.  In the ten years since, 18 states have enacted 
new legislation regarding direct shipment.  Of those, only two adopted simple reciprocity 
laws.  Ten states moved to allow direct shipment, but require some form of permitting on 
the part of the consumer, the winery, or both prior to shipping.  These permitting schemes 
also vary in cost, with some states offering free permits while others require fees that 
make direct shipment unappealing for most wine purchases.  Three states elected to allow 
consumers to special order wine through the state’s three-tier system, with delivery either 
to the distributor or a retailer.  Finally, three other states chose not to relax their 
prohibitions against direct shipment, and increased the penalty for violations from 
misdemeanor to felony offenses.  Figure 2 illustrates the resulting patchwork of state 
regulations on interstate direct shipment of wine that currently exist. 
3.4  Public v. Private in Direct Shipment Regulation? 
As discussed in Section 2, the economics literature on regulation assumes two general 
rationales for regulation: public interests and private interests.  If direct shipment 
prohibitions prior to 1986 were in place solely for public welfare reasons, it would be   12
difficult to explain why California’s decision to adopt reciprocity would have its intended 
effect of opening up access to no-shipment states.  The reciprocity incentive only affected 
wine producers in no-shipment states that desired to direct ship their wines to California 
consumers.  Thus, the fact that 23 states moved to allow direct shipment under either 
reciprocity or some form of permitting system suggests that, at some margin, the 
economic interests of wine producers in those states outweighed whatever public interest 
allegedly supported the original direct shipment prohibition.   
However, the time it took states to adopt direct shipment and the varied forms in 
which direct shipment was enacted suggests that whatever interests were driving the 
move toward direct shipment varied across states.  What is not obvious is the degree to 
which public versus private interests determined those differences.  While adopting direct 
shipment (and thereby gaining access to other reciprocity states) may be good for a 
state’s wine industry, distributors and retailers in the state may object to the possibility of 
lost sales as consumers shift their purchasing of higher priced, higher margin wines to 
direct shipping channels.  Moreover, a state with a relatively infant wine industry may 
delay adoption of direct shipment until its industry is in a better position to compete with 
direct shipment competitors.  To the extent the state is a player in the industry, either in 
terms of ownership of distribution and/or retail operations or in terms of revenues 
generated by taxes and licenses, the state itself may have economic incentives to support 
or prohibit direct shipment.  Thus, failure to adopt direct shipment allowances or delays 
in adoption might result from either public interest concerns or contrary economic 
interests.     13
We attempt to assess whether public or private interests were the driving factors 
in the adoption of direct shipment legislation, and which private interests were most 
influential in determining states’ decisions.  The following section describes the data and 
methods used to examine these factors and to test whether direct shipment regulation is 
determined by public welfare concerns or private economic interests. 
IV.  Data and Methods 
As noted above, at least 160 bills have been introduced across 43 states to change states’ 
regulation of direct shipment of wine.  In the 17 years since California’s opening salvo, 
23 states have passed legislation allowing direct shipment.  These direct shipment rules 
fall under two categories: straight reciprocity and permitting systems.  Thus, the issue 
involves three questions.  First, what factors affect the likelihood that a state will pass 
direct shipment legislation?  Second, are those factors different when states choose 
reciprocity verses permitting systems?  Finally, why do some states respond quickly with 
legislation while others take longer? 
  In order to address the questions, we collect information for all 47 non-direct 
shipment states for the period 1986 to 2001.  We collect information on the size and 
structure of the states’ wine production, distribution, and retail sectors, as well as wine 
consumption.  In order to capture the economic interests of the state, we collect 
information on the states’ wine-based tax revenues and overall fiscal health.  We also 
collect information concerning public welfare issues related to alcohol, general ideology 
measures, and the nature of states’ incumbent alcohol regulatory philosophy.  In order to 
provide a better context for understanding the details of our data collection and variable 
construction, we begin with a discussion of our modeling technique.   14
4.1 The  Model 
We use a competing risks hazard model to determine the likelihood that a state will 
choose to deregulate by adopting either reciprocity or a permit system at time t, given that 
the state has not yet deregulated and given a set of explanatory variables.  The competing 
risks hazard model is an event history, or duration model that seeks to explain both the 
timing of regulatory adoption and the type of regulation adopted.  Such event history 
models are often used in the political science literature, where “the duration spent in one 
social state affects the probability some entity will make a transition to another social 
state” (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones).  Duration models have also been employed in 
economics to study the duration of unemployment spells (Kiefer; Meyer) and rates of 
deregulation (Kroszner and Strahan), and in finance to estimate the effects of bond 
characteristics on the likelihood of default verses calls (McDonald and Van de Gucht).
1 
  The hazard function, λ(t), is composed of two parts.
2  The first is a baseline 
hazard function that varies exclusively as a measure of time, λ0(t).  The second part of the 
hazard function is a function of the explanatory variables, and is commonly noted as 
exp(X´β), where X is a vector of the explanatory variables for a given observation and β 
is a parameter vector.  The model allows for either static or time-varying explanatory 
variables.  Therefore, the hazard function can be written as (Kennedy): 
λ(t) = λ0(t) exp(X(t)´β) 
  Duration models differ based on the assumed form of the baseline hazard, λ0(t).  
The baseline hazard may be estimated using a specified form (parameterized) or an 
                                                 
1 Box-Steffensmeier and Jones provide a concise, reader friendly summary of event history models in 
political science.  Keifer explains the relevance of duration models in economics primarily in the context of 
unemployment, but also discusses several other areas in which  
2 For a discussion of the statistical properties of hazard functions, see Keifer, Meyer, McDonald and Van de 
Gucht, or Han and Hausman.   15
unspecified (nonparametric or semi-parametric) form.  Parametric forms frequently 
include exponential forms, log-logistic forms, and Weibull distributions.  Han and 
Hausman and Meyer show that, when the baseline hazard rate is unknown, a semi-
parametric approach yields more efficient results than parametric specifications.  This is 
particularly true in competing risks hazard models, where subjects may exit the pool by 
more than one type of “hazard” that may be characterized by different baseline rates.   
In our study, non-direct shipment states may exit the pool by adopting either 
reciprocity or permitting systems.  Given the different patterns of adoption over time, as 
illustrated in Figure 3, we have good reason to believe the baseline hazard rate may differ 
for the two different types of hazards.  Consequently, we follow Meyer and McDonald 
and Van de Gucht, and use a semi-parametric specification that includes a vector of time-
varying dummies to estimate the effect of time on the baseline hazard.  Thus, our 
estimated hazard model has the form: 
λ(t) = λ0(t) exp(X(t)´β) exp(D(t)´c) 
where λ0, X, and β are as defined above, D is the vector of time-varying dummies, and c 
is a coefficient parameter vector. 
4.2 Dependent  Variable 
Our sample begins in 1986 with all 47 non-direct shipment states and continues through 
2001.  We use a polytomous dependent variable for each state equal to 0 if the state does 
not pass direct shipment legislation in the observation year.  If the state passes reciprocity 
legislation, the dependent variable assumes a value of 1; it if passes a permit system, a 
value of 2.  We assume that states can only move from non-direct shipment to direct 
shipment once.  Thus, if a state’s dependent variable takes on a non-zero value in a given   16
year, the state is dropped from the hazard pool and is not observed in the rest of the 
sample period.  States that do not adopt any direct shipment legislation remain in the pool 
throughout the sample.  Such right-censored observations are an additional reason for 
employing the hazard model framework. 
4.3 Explanatory  Variables 
As described above, we attempt to capture economic versus public interests as they 
influence the adoption of direct shipment laws.  We collect information on private sector 
economic interests, public sector economic interests, and proxies for public welfare 
related to alcohol consumption.  Table 1 provides summary statistics. 
4.3.1  Private Sector Economic Interests 
The primary private sector interests we identify relate to the size and structure of the 
state’s wine industry at the production, distribution, retail, and consumer levels.  For wine 
production, we determined the number of wineries in each state by listings in various 
issues of Wines & Vines Annual Buyers Guide.  The number of wineries in each state was 
scaled by the gallons of wine consumed in the state, as reported in Adam’s Wine 
Handbook.  We also calculate the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) and the Gini 
Coefficient for the state wine industry in each year based on winery storage capacity as 
reported in Wines & Vines Annual Buyer’s Guide.  Although the two are related, they 
address fundamentally different aspects of market structure. The Gini coefficient is 
primarily a measure of dispersion, or inequality, among industry participants.  The HHI is 
primarily a measure of industry concentration; although it does pick up dispersion across 
firms.     17
Consider, for example, a market with two equally sized duopolists and a market 
with a dominant firm controlling 70% of the market and a competitive fringe of 30 firms 
each comprising 1% of the market.  The HHI measures for these two markets would be 
5,000 and 4,930, respectively.  Conversely, the Gini coefficient for the former would be 
zero while for the latter it would be 0.67.  We may well expect these markets to behave 
differently.  Reliance upon only the HHI or the Gini would not necessarily capture the 
nature of the market structure.  We do check the correlation coefficient to assure no 
statistical problems, and it in fact is quite low (0.16).   
We expect the number of wineries relative to state consumption to be positively 
associated with adoption of direct shipment regulation.  A larger number of wineries 
suggests not only a larger industry lobby, but a greater need to seek out markets in other 
states.  We also expect the winery HHI to be positively related to direct shipment.  
Previous research shows more concentrated industries are generally more politically 
effective (for example, see Kroszner and Strahan).  The winery Gini, on the other hand, 
we expect to have a negative relationship.  The Gini value ranges from zero (an evenly 
distribute market) to one (an extremely unevenly distributed market).  The greater the 
Gini value, one would infer an industry made up of many disproportionately small 
producers with a few relatively large firms.  A greater dispersion of economic interests is 
likely to make the wine industry less politically effective.   
  We use the same measures of sector size and structure for distribution in the state, 
namely, the number of distributors per gallon of wine consumed, the distributor HHI, and 
the distributor Gini coefficient in each state in each year.  The number of distributors was 
determined by listings in the “Wines and Spirits Distributors” section of the National   18
Beverage Marketing Directory, and was scaled by gallons of wine consumption as with 
the wineries.  The HHI and Gini measures are calculated based on distributors’ sales 
revenue as reported in the National Beverage Marketing Directory.  Because distributors 
are the obvious victim of direct shipping, we expect the signs to be opposite those on the 
winery variables.  In particular, we expect the number and concentration of distributors to 
be negatively related to adoption of direct shipment legislation, while we expect the Gini 
(dispersion) measure to be positively related to passage. 
For retail, no reliable figures are available for the number and sales of wine retail 
outlets by state for the entire sample period, so we cannot construct similar measures.  
Instead, we use the ratio of retail wine sales as a share of gross state product to measure 
the size of the retail wine industry.  This is not a perfect measure, since it could capture 
either retailers’ interests in protecting wine flows through their outlets or consumers’ 
demand for wine, which might suggest greater demand for access to difficult-to-find out-
of-state labels.  Not surprisingly, retail sales, even as a percentage of gross state product, 
are highly correlated with per capita wine consumption, so there is no clear way to 
account for which force might be reflected in this measure.  Consequently, we cannot 
sign this demand measure ex ante.   
4.3.2  Public Sector Economic Interests 
The state is not necessarily an independent agent in regards to direct shipment of 
alcoholic beverages.  States generate revenue both from excise taxes on alcohol and from 
licensing fees charged to alcohol distributors and retailers.  We include variables for both 
alcohol revenue sources (excise taxes and licensing fees) as a percentage of total state   19
revenue.  The data were collected from the U.S. Department of Commerce’s annual 
Government Finance Series.   
Most state reciprocity laws expressly allow wineries and consumers to avoid the 
excise tax.  States that are more reliant on those funds may be less likely to pass such 
legislation.  In the case of licensing fees, the argument is less clear.  Because direct 
shipment is not likely to change the number of licensed distributors or retailers in a state, 
there may be less concern regarding licensing fees.  Moreover, a fee-based permitting 
system may increase total licensing fee revenues.  Consequently, the effect of licensing 
fee revenue on reciprocity is unclear, and may actually increase the probability of 
adopting a permit system. 
4.3.3 Public  Interests 
As discussed earlier, courts evaluating Commerce Clause cases generally consider 
whether the state has a compelling public interest in restricting interstate commerce.  In 
the instance of the Twenty-First Amendment cases, public interest in promoting 
temperance is typically prime consideration.  Since we do not have good direct measures 
of public interest in the case of direct shipping, we employ a variety of variables to proxy 
different ways in which such public interests might be reflected or determined. 
  One measure of a state’s alcohol regulation philosophy is whether the state has a 
control or license distribution system.  In control systems, the state government acts as 
the distributor, and in some cases also as the retailer.  In license jurisdictions, private 
parties are licensed to act as distributors or retailers.  We employ a dichotomous variable 
that takes a value of 1 for license jurisdictions and 0 for control states.  Since control 
states have demonstrated a preference for more regulatory control of alcohol, we expect   20
license state to be more likely to pass direct shipment regulation (i.e., we expect a 
positive sign on the license variable). 
  We also use a measure of government ideology originally created by Berry, et. al., 
and now available from the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research.  
This measure is meant to capture the political conservatism or liberalism of states’ 
governments.  The government ideology measure is essentially a weighted index of the 
political affiliation of elected state officials, adjusted for voting record scores produced 
by the Americans for Democratic Action and the AFL-CIO Committee on Political 
Education.  A weighted average score is generated for each body of the state legislature 
and the governor, which are then weighted by 25% for each legislative house and 50% 
for the governor to arrive at a final score.  The score ranges from 0 to o100, with 0 being 
most conservative (Republican) and 100 being most liberal (Democratic).  Although we 
have no strong a priori argument that one political party would necessarily be more likely 
to pass direct shipment regulation, Republicans are generally viewed as being more 
supportive of free trade, suggesting a negative relation between this index and direct 
shipment.  However, Republicans are generally more supportive of states’ rights and are 
more likely influenced by conservative groups that promote temperance.  Unfortunately, 
these data are only available through 1999. 
  Finally, we include variables reflecting negative social impacts of alcohol 
consumption, namely DUI arrests and violations of existing liquor control laws, such as 
minor possession, distribution to minors, etc.  We use data from the U.S. Department of 
Justice’s Handbook of Criminal Justice Statistics to calculate the percentage of DUI and 
liquor law violations relative to all arrests, each year by state.  Unfortunately, the   21
Handbook occasionally omitted data for a given state and was available only through 
1999.  However, for those observations where available, we expect higher incidences of 
alcohol-related arrests would decrease the likelihood of passing direct shipment 
legislation.   
 
V. Empirical  Results 
We collect the above data for each state beginning in 1986 and continuing either until the 
state adopts direct shipment legislation or until 2001.  This results in 610 total state-year 
observations.  We estimate the competing risks hazard model described in Section 4.1 
using a maximum likelihood multinomial logistics regression with robust standard errors 
clustered by state.  The multinomial logistic model produces two sets of parameter 
results; one for the “hazard” of adopting reciprocity legislation and one for permit 
system.  Both sets of parameters are relative to the default outcome of not passing direct 
shipment legislation of either sort. 
  As noted above, a few of our public interest variables are not available past 1999.  
Consequently, we estimate the model over the restricted time period (1986-1999), which 
reduces the possible sample to 557 observations.  Due to missing observations in the 
arrest data, the final sample includes 529 observations.  The results are presented in Table 
2 as Model A.  The time-varying dummy variables used to flexibly parameterize the 
baseline hazard function all had signs and magnitudes consistent with the respective 
trends illustrated in Figure 3.  They are omitted from the tables for brevity’s sake and can 
be obtained from the authors upon request.   22
Panel A of Table 2 shows results for the reciprocity hazard.  As expected, the 
number of wineries relative to state wine consumption is positive and strongly 
significant.  Winery concentration (HHI) has the expected positive sign but is not 
significant.  Greater winery dispersion (Gini) significantly reduces the likelihood of 
adopting reciprocity, as expected.  All of the distributor industry variables are significant 
at the 5% level or better and have the expected signs.  More distributors and higher 
concentration reduce the likelihood reciprocity direct shipment will be passed, while 
greater dispersion increases the likelihood of reciprocity.  Thus, economic interests 
appear to affect regulatory outcomes in expected ways. 
  Of the public interest variables, dependence on excise taxes is weakly significant 
and negatively related to the likelihood of adopting direct shipment, suggesting states’ 
financial interests play a role in direct shipment.  Whether the state operates a control or 
license distribution system has the expected positive sign, meaning license states are 
more likely to adopt reciprocity, and is significant at the 1% level.  Similarly, Democratic 
state legislatures are less likely to adopt reciprocity, suggesting Republic pro-trade 
leanings affect interstate commerce as well.  The one puzzle in the public interest 
variables is a positive and strongly significant coefficient on DUI arrests.  We have no 
good rationale for such a result, but we note it is certainly inconsistent with the idea that 
states with high DUI arrest rates would be more permissive with reciprocity legislation.  
Perhaps lawmakers think that, by having wine shipped directly to ones home, the 
incidence of drunk driving would decrease. 
  Panel B of Table 2 presents results for the permit system “hazard.”  In general, 
few estimates are significant at even the 10% level.  Of those that are significant, wine   23
industry concentration, distribution industry dispersion, and excise tax dependence have 
the expected signs, as in the reciprocity results.  Interestingly, the number of wineries is 
negatively associated with adoption of permit systems.  This is counter to our original 
expectations, but is not necessarily counter-intuitive.  Given that new legislation 
represents a certain degree of “lock-in”, wineries may opposed permit-based direct 
shipment if they believe a reciprocity alternative might otherwise be available.  If 
wineries though passage of a permit system would preclude the opportunity to pass 
simple reciprocity, they may opt to retain that legislative option by opposing a permit bill. 
  On the whole, the results from Model A are largely consistent with an economic 
interest theory of regulation and show little evidence of public interest factors playing a 
significant role in determining interstate direct shipping regulation.  Indeed, the results on 
alcohol-related arrests indicate a positive, and in the case of reciprocity a significantly 
positive, effect on allowing direct shipment, counter to a public interest rationale. 
  Because the above specification has missing observations resulting from flaws in 
the arrest data, we re-estimate the model without the liquor law and DUI arrest variables.  
The results are reported as Model B in Table 2.  Comparing the results to Model A, there 
are no substantive changes in the direction of relationship, only the level of significance.  
By and large, the results are consistent across the board.  Private economic interests 
appear to significantly affect the likelihood of regulatory change in direct shipment.  A 
log-likelihood ratio test fails to reject the hypothesis that the constrained model performs 
significantly differently. 
  Finally, we omit the government ideology and arrest variables and re-estimate the 
model using the full sample from 1986 to 2001.  The results of this specification are   24
reported in Table 3.  Once again, the number of wineries has a strong positive association 
with passage of reciprocity legislation and dispersion among wineries has a negative, 
though weakly significant, effect.  Increased concentration among distributors reduces the 
likelihood of passage, though more dispersed distribution industries increase the 
likelihood of passage.  States with license distribution systems continue to appear more 
likely to adopt reciprocity.  Results on the permit system are likewise consistent with 
earlier results, both in their relatively poorer performance and also in the direction and 
significance of economic interest factors.   
 
VI. Conclusions 
California’s 1986 passage of reciprocity direct shipment regulation represented a 
tightening of California’s borders with respect to wines from other states.  The purpose of 
that legislation was to pry open the borders of the 47 states that prohibited interstate 
direct shipment of wine to their citizens.  In the 17 years that follow, a flurry of 
legislation has been considered in at least 43 states, with 23 states adopting some form of 
direct shipment allowance.  Our purpose in this paper is to identify the factors that drive 
the adoption of direct shipment.  Using data on private and public interests regarding 
direct shipping, we estimate a competing risks hazard model and find that private 
economic interests appear to play a dominant role in determining the adoption of direct 
shipment laws. 
  These results have immediate consequence for the legal battles raging across the 
country contesting the constitutionality of direct shipment laws.  To the extent that public 
welfare interests are required by courts to justify states’ restrictions on interstate   25
commerce, our results cast a shadow of doubt on public interest arguments in the area of 
direct shipment of wine.   
  The patchwork of direct shipment regulation also suggests opportunities for 
further research on the nature and structure of distribution relationships.  To the extent 
small wineries find alternative means for accessing consumer markets through direct 
shipment, do distribution contracts in those markets change and do they differ from those 
in states that continue to prohibit direct shipment?  The lessons of direct shipment of 
wine may also have consequence for other alcoholic beverages, particularly specialty 
microbrew beers that face similar distribution hurdles to small wineries.    26
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Figure 1.  Total Number of Wineries, 1984-2002 
 
This figure depicts the growth in U.S. wineries over the period as well as the relative 
growth in California versus the rest of the country.   
 




























Other U.S. 584 691 716 703 766 774 803 796 803 817 850 876 878 977 1153 1233 1473 1461 1629
California 662 676 739 750 775 799 807 827 845 866 922 944 877 1011 1185 1210 1156 1355 1553
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Sources:  Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, 
WineAmerica, Wine Institute, Wines & Vines  
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Figure 2.  Current State Regulations on Interstate Direct Shipment of Wine 
This figure illustrates the current array of state regulations on interstate direct shipment of 
wine and graphically offers an indication of the direction and relative restrictiveness of 
the different regulatory regimes.  Within permitting, there is an additional degree of 
restrictiveness related to the cost of permits, who has to purchase the permit, and how 
easy it is to receive.  We make no distinction among these states here. 
 
SUMMARY OF CHANGES IN DIRECT SHIPMENT





























































* Denotes states that have reacted in multiple ways to direct shipment.
** Rhode Island allowed direct shipment via a permit from 1956 until the regulation was repealed in 2001.
Sources:  State statutes, Wine Institute State-by-State Analysis.  Note that Alaska is excluded because it allowed importation prior to 1986.  
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Figure 3. Cox-Proportional Hazard Plots for Adoption of Direct Shipment 
The Cox-Proportional Hazard is calculated by dividing the number of hazard events in a 
given time period by the number of states remaining in the risk pool in that time period 
(i.e., states that had not yet adopted direct shipment legislation). 
 
Panel A. Reciprocity Hazard Rate 







































































































Hazard Rate of Adoption Polynomial Trendline
 
 







































































































Hazard Rate of Adoption Polynomial Trendline
HAZARD RATES OF ADOPTING PERMIT
REGULATION, 1986-2002
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Table 1. Summary Statistics for Explanatory Variables 
The following table reports summary statistics for the set of variables used in the 
empirical estimation.  Where the number of observations is less that 610, it reflects a lack 
of available data for the particular variable in certain years.  In the case of government 
ideology, liquor law violations, and DUIs, data were not available past 1999.  HHI and 
Gini values were calculated by the authors using the same data that generated the number 
of operators per gallon of wine consumed in each state.  Both liquor law violations and 
DUIs are reported as proportions of all arrests in the state.   
 
Variable Name  Observations Mean  Std. Dev.  Minimum  Maximum 
Wineries per gallon 
consumed  610 0.0013  0.00123 0  0.0084 
Winery HHI  610  4531.322  3310.455  0  10000 
Winery Gini  610  0.3916  0.2958  0  0.9825 
Distributors per 
gallon consumed  610 0.0036  0.0038  0.0001  0.0227 
Distributor HHI  610  1168.575  1317.664  0  10000 
Distributor Gini  610  0.4447  0.1982  0  0.8980 
Retail Sales of Wine 
as % of GSP  610 0.0020  0.0010  0.0002  0.0071 
Excise Taxes as % 
Total State Revenue  610 0.0118  0.0077  0.0004  0.0656 
License Fees as % 
Total State Revenue  610 0.0008  0.0007  0  0.0044 
License State (=1)  610  0.5836  0.49346  0  1 
Gov’t Ideology  557  50.6733  25.5857  0  97.9167 
Liquor law 
violations  531 0.0636  0.0492  0  0.26357 
DUIs 529  0.1215  0.0603  0  0.39627 
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 Table 2. Competing Risks Hazard Results, 1986-1999 
This table presents results from maximum likelihood multinomial logistic regressions for 
the likelihood of passing either reciprocity or permit-based direct shipment legislation 
during the period 1986 to 1999.  The models were estimated with robust standard errors 
clustered by state.  Coefficients on the time-varying dummies are not reported for 
brevity’s sake; complete results are available from the authors upon request.  ***, **, and 





 MODEL  A  MODEL  B 
Variable Name  Coefficient  RSE  Coefficient  RSE 
  --------------------  Reciprocity  Risk  ------------------ 
Wineries Per Gal. Consumed  2561.61***  631.452  1923.65***  538.52 
Wine Industry Concentration (HHI)  0.00009  0.0002  -0.00006  0.0002 
Wine Industry Dispersion (Gini)  -10.06**  4.136  -6.73**  3.69 
Distributors Per Gal. Consumed  -559.60**  241.32  -94.49  159.49 
Distribution Industry Concentration (HHI)  -0.0048*** 0.0011  -0.002*** 0.0008 
Distribution Industry Dispersion (Gini)  21.54*** 7.79  17.63***  6.59 
Retail Wine Sales % GSP  -579.68  1244.99  -237.02  969.31 
Excise Taxes % Total Revenue  -211.98*  136.80  -87.94  135.04 
License Fees % Total Revenue  532.19  1067.56  -476.21  1061.01 
License Jurisdiction  5.56***  2.17  3.62*  2.52 
Government Conservatism  -0.079***  0.024  -0.054**  0.025 
DUI Arrests  38.98**  16.63     





PERMIT SYSTEM RESULTS 
 MODEL  A  MODEL  B 
Variable Name  Coefficient  RSE  Coefficient  RSE 
  ------------------------  Permit Risk  ----------------------- 
Wineries Per Gal. Consumed  -1375.17*  1071.37  -1091.06  1033.82 
Wine Industry Concentration (HHI)  0.00014*  0.00011  0.0001  0.0001 
Wine Industry Dispersion (Gini)  -1.56  2.50  -2.54  2.43 
Distributors Per Gal. Consumed  -110.64  152.36  -63.28  119.30 
Distribution Industry Concentration (HHI)  0.00008  0.0003  0.0001  0.0003 
Distribution Industry Dispersion (Gini)  7.57*  4.04  6.86**  3.79 
Retail Wine Sales % GSP  -118.42  419.28  -143.79  449.91 
Excise Taxes % Total Revenue  -223.70*  157.55  -228.57**  102.46 
License Fees % Total Revenue  1163.25  1423.27  946.08  1000.00 
License Jurisdiction  -0.379  2.08  -0.389  2.01 
Government Conservatism  -0.008  0.02  -0.017  0.016 
DUI Arrests  0.473  12.96     
Liquor Law Violations  11.16  12.64     
COMPETING RISKS HAZARD MODEL RESULTS 
 MODEL  A  MODEL  B 
Number of Observations  529  557 
Log Likelihood  -44.902  -49.205 
Pseudo R
2 0.9227  0.9196 
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Table 3.  Competing Risks Hazard Model, Full Sample 
 
This table presents results from maximum likelihood multinomial logistic regressions for 
the likelihood of passing either reciprocity or permit-based direct shipment legislation 
during the period full sample, omitting some of our public interest variables.  The models 
were estimated with robust standard errors clustered by state.  Coefficients on the time-
varying dummies are not reported for brevity’s sake; complete results are available from 
the authors upon request.  ***, **, and * signify statistical significance at the 1%, 5%,and 
10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
COMPETING HAZARDS RESULTS, FULL SAMPLE 
 RECIPROCITY  PERMIT 
Variable Name  Coefficient  RSE  Coefficient  RSE 
   
Wineries Per Gal. Consumed  1219.21***  447.99  -642.88  536.57 
Wine Industry Concentration (HHI)  -0.00005  0.0001  0.0001*  0.00007 
Wine Industry Dispersion (Gini)  -3.84*  2.98  -0.741  1.41 
Distributors Per Gal. Consumed  81.026  138.86  67.119  67.05 
Distribution Industry Concentration (HHI)  -0.0010*  0.0006  -0.00002  0.0002 
Distribution Industry Dispersion (Gini)  12.15**  5.65  1.076  2.741 
Retail Wine Sales % GSP  -8.04  479.93  -157.69  350.50 
Excise Taxes % Total Revenue  -75.79  90.07  -140.03*  102.75 
License Fees % Total Revenue  -854.83  730.57  575.13  880.10 
License Jurisdiction  2.09*  1.44  0.382  1.152 
 
 MODEL   
Number of Observations  610   
Log Likelihood  -70.029   
Pseudo R
2 0.8955   
 
 